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It is only when a spee ch activity potentially has communicative
inter chan ge value with someone other ·than the protected victim
that th e victim's location becomes relevant to the governme nt 's
ability to protect her , even from nonspeech hanns. Sometimes the
governm ent may nevertheless act to prot ect individuals from nonspeech harm s, but the magnitude of the individual interests that
form th e reason for the government's action mu st be weighed
against the free speech value of the communicative interchange
that might be restricted. The location of the victim is relevant in
this balance only because it signals the magnitude of both the likelihood of communicative interchange with others and the victim's
privacy inter est. Where the victim is in her home, the Court has
found a greater government interest in prote cting her from intrusion than when she is in some other location. 157 Specifically, speec h
targeted at a home may have "a broad er communicative purpose ,"158but its location, compared to other, more publi c .ones,
make s it less likely that the publicly communicative purpose will be
realized and more likely that it will severely intrude on a victim who
has "no ready means of avoiding the unwanted spee ch. ,,m
In sum, the government has broad discretion to prot ect an individual 's right to be left alone from nonspeech banns even when
the y result from speech occuning on a publi c street or sidewalk.
Even where Free Speech Clause restrictions apply, physical location
is onl y a signal for when a particular balan ce between competing
constitutional interests is likely to atta ch. In circumstances where
the presumption that arises from physical location does not hold
true , constitutional principles , rath er than rigid geography, will
pr evail.
B. The Right to Avoid SpeechHarms
Speech harms are tho se that come from the con tent of an expression. That is, the communicative impact of the speec h activity
inflicts a psychic wound, such as an ger , shame, resenun ent , or offense. Un like regulation to pre vent nonspe ech harm s, which may
often raise no free speech clause qu estion , regulation to prevent
137. Cmnpare
Frisby v. &hultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988) (restricting targeted residential
picketing even though the activity may have "a broader communicative purpose"), with Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773 (1994) (stating tha t the clinic may protect
its patients from the harm caused by outdoor placards by "pull(ing] its curtains" ).
138. FrisbJ
, 487 U.S. al 486.
139. Id. at 487.
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also not to listen.m Although one way to reconcile the se conflictin g
implications is to align them with the geographical distincti on between public places and the home ,t16 simply to state the distin ction
is not to explain it. The que stion remains , why, when there are no
listeners other than the one who is unwilling , the home should be
special with respect to protecting the autonomy of the individu al to
choose not to listen, while a public forum effectively imposes an
obligation to listen .
A. PossibleExp!,anatum.s
jc,r the Geographical
Distinction

Numerous possible explanations und erlie th e righ t to listen 's
geographical distinction. Although they individually or toge ther
may support a pr esumption based upon the listener 's physical location, they do not support the current rigid geographical line.
1. ListenersAre "C,aptive"in Their Homes WhereasThey Are Capable
ofAvoiding Unwanted Speech 'Whenon a Public Street c,r Sidewalk-The
scope of the free speech right implied by the Court is perhaps best
illustrated by example. In invalidating Jesse Cantwell's breach of
the peace conviction for playing a phon ograph record criticizing
the Roman Catholic Church to conse nting passersby on the street
in an effort to pro selytize them , the Court noted tha t he was en217
gaged "only [in] an effort to pe rsuade a willing listener" and that,
upon being told th at the speech was unwanted, "he would take th e
victrola and [go away]."218 The Court's recent statements ·about the
scope of the free speech right in a public forum imply that Cantwell's regard for the receptivity of his audien ce was mere
politeness, irrel evant to th e permissible scope of government restrictions. In fact, so long as he refrain ed from non speech condu ct
that the government could prohibit , Cantwell had th e constitutional right to target individual listeners regardless of their consent,
to ignore their requests that he cease his communications , and to
continue to pur sue them with his victrola until they reached prop erty from which he could lawfully be excluded.
These listeners do not fit the profil e of the presumptively "free "
public forum listeners whom the Court has contrast ed to the listeners "captive" in their homes. In de scribing th e "special benefit
215. Seesupronote148 and accompanying text.
216. See,e.g.,Frisby,487 U.S. at 484 ("[T)he home is differen t") .
217. c:antweU
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,310 (1940). '
218. Id. at 309.
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unwanted expr ession where the burden of private avoidance
threatens other free spee ch int erests. n 6
Of course, another response to the plight of the pursued public
listeners is that they will eventually reach their homes or some
other type of pr otec ted property. The existence of an ultimate refuge thus distingui shes th e burden of listening to repeated
unwanted speech in public as opposed to in the home . While this
distinction exists between an individually targeted listener in public
and in the hom e, there also exists the distinction between the un. willing public listener who can easily avoid the speech and one who
is pursued . The fact that the former distinction exists does not explain why it is more constitutionally significant than the latter.
Rather, as the ease of avoiding speech has been the articulated basis for including within the free sp eech guarantee the right to
impose it even on listeners who are unwilling, whether the ease exists would seem to be more significant than physical location in
determining the scope of the free speech right in situations that
fall between the decided cases.
2. ConstitutionallyPermissibl.eConductRestrictionsSufficientlyProtect
the Unwilling Public Listener-As noted above, the Free Speech
Clause does not restrict the government's choice whether to protect individuals from nonspeech harm s imposed by either the
nonspeech or speech conduct of other private individuals. m So, the
government may choose to protect unwilling listen ers from nonspeech harms caused by speec h or conduct. In the context of an
unwilling public listen er pursu ed by a persistent speaker, these
228
harms would include harassment , intimidation, 229 as well as th e
harms inflicted by threats2.,o and stalking." 1 Undergirding the implication that the governme nt cannot choose to protect individuals
from speech harms on a public street or sidewalk is the assumption
that the government 's power to puni sh the imposition of

226. &e, e.g.• Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., !512U.S. 753, 772-7'!, (1993) ("The
First Amendment does not demand that patients at a medical facility undertake Herrulean
efforts 10 escape the cacophony of p olitical protests.").
227. &esuproPartIJAl-2 .
228. SttSchenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357,385 (1997) (justifying a speech resbiction basedupon "previous harassment ... of patients" ).
229. SeeMadstn,512 U.S. at 774 (noting tha t th e government may "burden[] speech ...
to prevent intimidation).
230. Stt id. (stating that threats are "independently pr05Cribable").
231. Cf id. at 77'!>-74(implying that a court could protect an individual from being
• 'stalked or shadowed'• if the conduct led to duress or intimidat1on).
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nonspeech harm s sufficiently protects the legitim ate interests of
th e unwi "lli ng li stener. %32
Taken at face value , this assumption as to the scope of protection that an unwillin g listener may legitimately expect from the
government appears to be an acknowledgment that , in contrast to
a listener's protection in the hom e and in conflict with some of the
Cou rt 's m ore general articulations, a sreaker's right in a public
2
place implies an obligation to listen. ' Tha t is, the n onspeech
h arms against which the Court has recogn ized that the government
may legitimately provid e protection are exactly that-conduct
rather than expression. "• Their definitions generally require more
than the annoyance , offense, or psychologi cal distress that may
come from a gentle , but repea ted, unwant ed message and instead
require some sort of ph ysical obstru ction ,2,s physical hann ,2a6 or fear
th ereof.2" If indee d the Constitution impos es this limit on the
scope of governm ent protection, then it effectively also imposes,
through the free speech right , an obligation to listen .
Th e oth er possible explanati on of the judicial assump tion that
protecti on fr om nonspeech harms adequat ely addr esses the interests of the un willin g listene r is that a further un acknowledg ed
assumption underpins it. This assumption is that when sp eech
"goes too far " and th e burden on the speaker, although not rising
to the level of obstruction , pb,ysical harm , or fear, nevertheless becomes in judicial judgment "severe," th en the government may
pr otect the unwilling listener through one of the nonspe ech harm
pr ohibiti ons. 2 ,s Protectio ns against "harassment" are parti cularly
232. See,e.g., id. at 774 (limiting protest.en' speech as necessary to "prevent intimidation
[or] to ensure acceS'l tO the clinic").
233. Seesupran otes 22!>-;226and accompanyi ng text
234. See,e.g.,Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 383 (1997) (do ubting that a
"right ... to be left alone ... accurately reflecL~ . . . First Amendment jurisprudence" and
distinguishing Madsen, 512 U.S. at 753, as "sustain[in g) an injunction designed to secure
ph ysical access to the clinic, but not on the basis of any generalized right 'to be left alone' on
a publ ic street or sidewalk").
2:35. See,e.g., Madsen,512 U.S. at 774 (stating th at the government may only limit speech
activities as is necessary "to ensure access" to facilities).
236. See,t.g.,WtSConsinv. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) ("[A] physical assault is n0t
by any stretch of the imaginatio n expressive conduct protecte d by the F'ust Amendment.");
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 ( 1984) ("(V]iolence or other types of~
tend ally expr essive activities that produc e special banns distinct from their communicative
impa ct . . . are en titled to no constitutio nal pr otection."); NAACP v. Qai bome Hardware Co.,
458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) ('Th e First Amend men t does not protect violence :").
237. See,e.g.• Mad.sm,512 U.S. a t 774 (stating that the government may res trict speech
"so infused with yjoJence as to be indistinguishable from a th reat of physical hann ") .
238. Ste. e.g., Pro-Choice Network v. Schenc k, 67 F.3d 377, 395-96 (2d Cir. 1995)
(Winter , J., concurring) (distinguishing speech to "the general public" or to a voluntary listener from ins1ances "where specific individuals ~c targeted at locations difficult or
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susceptible to this use, and may, in practical effect, provide a scope
of protection similar to an explicit recognition of government
power to protect targeted unwilling listeners. !39 The problem with
this assumption is that it leaves the scope of the unwilling public
listener 's protection to judicial discretion, which is, in turn, confined by a doctrine that defines the scope of the free speech right
so broadly that courts must resort to fine nuances in characterization of speaker conduct to defend their decisions to protect
unwilling listeners. 2<1-0
In sum, absent subterfuge or creative worclplay, conduct restri ctions do not protect unwilling listeners from speech harms. If they
are the sole types of protection that the government can accord to
unwilling listeners in public places, then the Free Speech Clause
effectively impose s an obligation to listen.
3. In the Context of Speech OutsideAbartion Clinics, the Short Duration of Unwanted Speech &plains the Obligation to Listen-Another
possible explanation for the Court's skepticism that the government may choose to protect a targeted listener 's right to be left
alone on "a public street or sidewalk"m is that the further geographical qualification-that
the unwilling listener be seeking
"entrance to or exit from abortion clinics"m-is crucial to this constitutional judgment. According such significance to this location
qualification would mean that perhaps the government may choose
to protect a targeted listener's right to avoid unwanted speech in
other circumstances even if the listener is in a public location.
In one sense, limiting the scope of the obligation to listen in this
way can indeed help justify it. The most obvious distinction between. persistent speech outside an abortion facility and speech in
other publi c locations is spacial and temporal. Even pursuit in this
inconvenient for them to avoid, [where) the First Amendment's tolerance of plausiblycoercive or obstructionist protest is least" (emphas is added) (citation omitted)).
239. See,e.g.,id. at 396 (Wmter,J., concurring) (finding "no right to invade the personal
space of individuals going about lawful business. to dog their footsteps or chase them do"11 a
street, to scream or gesticulate in their faces, or to do anything else that cannot be fairly described as an attempt at peaceful persuasion"); see also Sdimck, 519 U.S. at 381 n .11
·(upholding a "cease and desist" provision based on the conclusion that it was a legitimate
effort to "accommodate" the speakers' rights when "the District Court was entitle d to conclude ... that the only feasible way to shield individuals ... from unprotected conduct ...
would ha,oebeen to keep the entire area clear of defendant protesters.").
24-0. ~ e.g.,Prr;C/ioiuNetwcrll,67 F.3d at 391-92 ("The purpose of [th e 'cease and desist') provision is not ... to suppress speech .because of the anxiety iis content produces in its
audience, but rather to pro~ide a vulnerab le group of medical patients with some relief from
the duress caused by unwelcome physical proximity to an extreme ly vocal group of demon strators." (citation omitl.ed) ).
241. Schmck,519 U.S, at 383.
242. Id..at 386 (Scalia.]., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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circumstance must take place within limited geographical boundaries and thus a limited time frame. These limitations, in turn, can
be seen to translate into limitations on the speech harms that may
243
be imposed on the unwilling listener.
These limitations may
therefore support a per se judgment that, when they apply, the
unwilling listener's burden will never outweigh the speaker's free
speech right and so there is_no right to be left alone within these
boundarie s.
But this type of line drawing is arbitrary in a number of respects.
First, like the other possible explanations, it does riot explain why a
targeted unwilling listener receives different protection outside an
abortion clinic than inside the home . Second, while potentially limiting the scope of an obligation to listen to unwanted speech, it fails
to explain what variables might change the speaker /lis tener balance in other situations. In particular , it fails to explain where or
when, after an initial rebuff by a listener, the government may restrict a speaker's continuing efforts of persuasion. Is two city blocks
too long a pursuit? Or, does ten minutes of peaceful but persistent
targeted speech become too long? Or two hours ? Or two days? By
failing to provide guidance as to these issues, the Court ensures
that a limitation of the obligation to listen in the area outside abortion clinics will become arbitrary in application as different
government actors reach different con clusions about the permissible scope of protection of unwilling listeners in other physical
location s.
For all of these reasons, a limitation of the implied obligation to
listen in the abortion .protest contex t, while perhaps attractive in
the short run, only compounds th e doctrinal confusion because it
fails to relate the relevancy of physical location to underlying Free
Speech Clause values.
4. AllowingNo Right to Be Left Alone in a PublicForumIs Necessary
to Ensure That PubliclyDirectedspee~hIs Fully.Protected-According to
243. But s«, e.g., Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1427
(W.D.N.Y.1992), ajf'd .rubnom. Pro.Q10ice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d !59 (2d Cir. 1994),
vacated in panon reh'gen bane, 67 F.3d 377 (2d Or. 1995), rev'd in pariand afl'd in part,519
U.S. 357 (1997). The court noted the following:
[T]he risks associated with an abortion increase if the patient suffers from additional
streM and anxiety [caused by abortion protest activities]. Increased stress and anxiety
can cause patients to : {l) have elevated blood pressure; (2) hyperventilate; (3) require
sedation; or (4) require special coun,eling and attention before they are able lo obtain health care. Patients may become so agitated that they are unable to lie sti.11
in the
operating room thereby increasing !he risks associated with surgery.
Id. at 1427.
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In practical application, th ese related concepts of individual
autonomy and willingness have led to a permissible range of gov·
ern m en t actions to protect individuals in their home s. Specifically,
the Court has accepted the government purpos e to protect the individual autonomy interest in "willing" comm unicative interactions
as a constitutional value that can justify what might otherwise appear to be an un constitutional speech restriction .258
As noted earlier, the scope of the autonomy protection around
the hom e is broad. The Court has uph eld, in its efforts to prot ect
the "willingness" of the acts of listening, government actions that
enfor ce individual decisions to reject further communications from
particular speakers after rec eipt and review of a first communication;2;g that enforce individual decisions not to receive broad types
of communications without any initial contact with the message/00
.and that prohibit certain types of communications from entering
the home without an individual rejection based on th e assumption
1
that they are so likely to be unwanted. ~ As demon strated above, 262
explanation s that relate to pres erving the possibility of communicative in terchange, as it has thu s far been articulated by th e Court, do
not justify the line that the Court has seemed to draw between
permissible government efforts to protect listener autonomy in
public plac es and in the home. The failure of these explanations
suggests that if willing interchange is indeed the Free Speech
Clause 's focus, th en the scope of prot ection for the individual ly
targeted listener should apply equally in public as well as in the
home.
Pot ential applications of this conclusion, however, draw it into
que stion. Specifically, in addition to validating government actions
268
such as "cease and desist" provisions, the translation of home rules
into publi c places would validate government actions to enforce , for

258. SeeF.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) ("[I]n t.he privacy oft.he
home ... the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendm ent rights
ofan tntruder." (citing Rowan,397 U.S. at 734; id. at 890.
259. SeeRowan, 397 U.S. at 734 (upholding a statute that gave the mail addressee
"complete and unfettered discretion in electing wbether or not he desired to receive furth er
material from a particular sender") .
260. Se.eMartin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943) ("A city can punish tho5C
who call at a home in defiance of the pfe\,iously expressed will of the occupant .... ").
261. SeeFrisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988) ("Because t.he [targeted] picketing . ..
is speech directed primarily at those who are presumptively unwilling to receive it, the State
has a substantial and justifiable interest in banning it.").
262. SeesuproPart IVA
·
263. This would be t.he analog to a government action enforcing an individual's decision
not to receive further mail from a partic ular sende r. SeeRowan,397 U.S. at 734.
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decision to reject speec h with th e homeowner where it belongs. 286
Government enforcement of a hom eowner 's decision to reject
communicati ons endorsing Demo cratic political candidates or advocating gun control, however, seems less compatible with free
speec h values. Although both types of governm ent action simply
enforce individual homeowne rs' decisions to reject unwanted
communications targeted at them only, the latter uses government
287
power to suppre ss speech because of its content, which represents the quinte ssential Free Speech Clause danger. 1188 Yet if a
homeown er has a spe cial righ t to avoid speech harms, then this
means of discriminating among them should not matt er.
Examination of the scope of the special status of the home, and
th e ideal scope of the protection of the possibility of communi cative interchang e reveals why this content discrimination, even in
the hom e, poses a copstitutional danger. Th e home has a special
status in constitutional doctrine asan individual 's one refuge from
otherwise compl etely pervasive majoritarian ·action. 289 As noted
above.290 this justification for its unique treatment does not exten d
to government efforts to prot ect unwilling listeners in the h ome
from private speakers. Th ese efforts put the weight of majoritarian
action on the side of the hom e-dweller restricting the free flow of
communication. Thus , the reasons that supp ort special treatment
of the home in other contex ts do not support the distinction with
respect to government action protecting unwilling listeners from
spee ch harm s.
Becau se a government action protecting an unwilling listener in
the home is a majoritarian action restricting the possibility of
communicativ e interchang e beyond the ideal balan ce of speech
flow and autono my interests, its spe ech justification should bear
th e same weight regardl ess of the listener's physical locatio n. Although this conclus ion would seem to dictat e the same treatment
of unwilling listeners regardless of physical location as a matter of
theory, other protections unique to the home dictate a broader
range of permis sible government protection in practice.
286. SeeMartin, 319 U.S. at 149.
287. SeeBoosv. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (defining a speech resui ction as content ·
based if itsjustification focuses on "the direct impact that speech has on its listeners") .
288. Stt R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("Content -based regulations ·
are presumptively invalid.").
289. Stt Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) ("Our prior decisions have often remarked on the unique nature of the home ... and have rec ognized Lhat '[ p]reserving the
sanc tity of the home, the one retreat 10 which men and women can repair to escape fro m the
uibulations of their daily p ursuits, is surely an important value." (quoting Carcyv. Brown, 447
U.S. 455,471 (1980))).
290. SeesupraPart IIl.B.2.
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balanc e obtain regardle ss of the listene r 's physical location, the
overlap in, practi ce of nonspeech aut onomy interests with speechrelated autonomy int erests means th at unwilling listeners may r~
ceive greater protection in the home. Recogn ition of this practical
effect could lead to restricting th e permissible scope of government
protection of the unwilling listener in th e public sphere to compen sate for the greate r protection at home. Again , however, it is
not nec essary to distort the theo retical ideal to recognize that overlapping spe ech in ter ests in th e public sphere may effectively lead to
speake r protections beyond the ideal balance in the same way that
the opposite effect occurs in the hom e.
Free Speech Clause doctrine appropriately prote cts communications deemed unwant ed by some, or even most, listeners when they
are plau sibly also directed at listen ers who have not rejected them.
Circumstances make it more difficult to isolate solely ind ividually
dir ected commun ications in public places than in the home. The
communicative inter change value dictates that th e pr esump tion,
when th e directi on of speec h is ambiguous , sho uld be that it is pulr
licly as well as individually directed. Given this pr esumption , an
individual rejection will not be ,enough to supp ort government action to pr otec t the unwillin g listener. Only ,~hen it is clear that a
listener has recei ved and rejected a targeted comm unic ation , will
th e ideal balan ce appl y.
Despite the fact that it may be more difficult to isolate instances
of solely individuall y directed communi cations in the public
sphere , it is not imp ossible to do so. Sidewalk counselo rs communicating with individual clinic patients in fact present an example
of a segregable instance of solely individually dire cted communication. That the presumpti on in the face of ambiguity is that the
speech is both publi cly and individuall y directed should not cause
the Court to ign or e the appr opri ate ideal balance when the ambiguity doe s not obtain.
c. Conclusion- Th at the ho.me is a refuge from the cacophony of
the public sphe re will prot ect most listen ers in their homes from
unwant ed communi cations targeted solely at them . Similarly, the
principle that public places must rema in open for even outrageous
communications wilJ protect mo st speake rs in most public places
from government efforts to sup pre ss their speech to serve the
autonomy inte rests of un willing listene rs. Both of these rules , however, repre sent presumptive balan ces of constitutional int ere sts and
pra ctical circumstances. These underlying values, rather than rigid
geographical distinction s, mu st form the most fundam ental guide
to det .ermi ning th e validity of any parti cular government action. So,
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for example, when a homedweller seeks to exclude speech solely
because of its message, the ideal "one bite" requirement should
limit the government's ability to protect the unwilling listener regardless of her location in a hom e. So, too, where the int erests
presented in a public place exactly duplicate the inter ests in the
home that the Court has balanced in favor of allowing the government to protect an unwilling speaker, then the constitutional
balance, rather than the rigid rule of physical location , should determine the validity of the government action.

CONCLUS ION

With respect to pro tection of an unwilling listener from speech
harms, the home should not be special. Rather, a balance between
the free spe ech value of pres erving the possibility of commun icative
interchange and the listener's autonomy interest in rejecting repeated unwanted communications should determine the validity of
a governme nt action to prot ect an unwilling listener. In pra ctical ·
effect, such government actions will be more likely valid with respect to listeners in the home than with respect to publicly located
listeners. This difference, however , does not relate to th e doctrinal
ideal, which is that a speaker get "one bite" of an individually targeted pr ospective listener, after which the government may enforce
the listener 's decision to reject further communications. Rather,
the apparently different treaunent of speakers and listeners according to their physical locations relates to the , pra ctical difficulties of
isolating situations that fit the constitutional ideal. In the home,
other legitimate int erests weigh in favor of the listener, and so in
ambiguous situations, listener intere sts may prevail. Similarly, in
public places, speaker intere sts with respect to listeners othe r than
the one seeking protection weigh in favor of the speaker, rendering government efforts to protect one listener invalid when others
are present. In both instances, however, the sameconstitutional ideal
should remain th e ultimate guidepost-;>reserving a possibility of
communicativ e interaction that include s regard for an individual 's
self-conscious decision to rejec t unwanted communications.

